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Abstract
In many markets homogenous goods are sold both by large global
firms (”chain stores”) and small local firms. Surprisingly, chain stores
often charge higher prices. Examples include hotels, airlines, and coffee
shops. We provide a simple model that can account for these pricing
patterns. In this model, consumers face costs when switching from
one supplier to another and change locations with a given probability.
Consequently, chain stores insure consumers against switching costs.
In equilibrium, chain stores charge higher prices, yet attract more con-
sumers. Profits of local stores and chain stores increase with consumer
mobility, but the latter do so faster.
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ture.
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1 Introduction
A bus trip from New York City to Boston is a fairly homogenous good. It
takes about four hours and twenty minutes and costs US$55 at the Grey-
hound/Peter Pan desk and US$15 at the Fung-Wah desk.1 Similarly, a big
cup of milk coffee in the Big Cup Café on 8th Avenue in Manhattan costs
US$3.60, while the largest cup of café latte in the Starbucks café on the
other side of the avenue is sold at US$3.95.2 Most strikingly perhaps, the
airfare for a return flight from Berlin to Cologne-Bonn costs Euro 395 if one
flies with Lufthansa and Euro 53 if one travels with German Wings.3
What is the common feature of these three pricing patterns? First,
arguably homogenous goods are sold at sometimes substantially different
prices. Second, one of the sellers is a large firm that is more or less globally
active and known by almost every potential consumer, while the other seller
is a small local firm that is most probably only known by customers familiar
with the locality. Third, the large firm charges the high price.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a parsimonious model that ex-
plains pricing patterns such as these. As the larger firms sell at higher
prices, it is clear from the outset that economies of scale cannot explain
these patterns. What seems to be at work here is a non-convexity in the
consumption technology. Potential customers of local firms must first learn
about the existence of the local provider. Once they know this, they have to
1Prices are as of May 2005. The online price is US$28-35 for Greyhound/Peter Pan and
US$15 for Fung-Wah. Greyhound/Peter Pan trips begin in Midtown Manhattan on 42nd
street, while Fung-Wah trips start in Chinatown in Manhattan on Canal street. Both
trips end at Boston South station.
2Both cafés are between 21st and 22nd street. Prices are as of spring 2005.
3Sources: www.lufthansa.de and www.germanwings.com. We choose return flights
because these are cheaper than one-way tickets for major carriers such as Lufthansa. The
price of the German Wings return ticket is the sum of two one-way tickets. The date of
booking was July 21, 2005. Lufthansa’s airport in Berlin is Tegel, while German Wings
flies from and to Berlin Schönefeld. For an outbound flight from Berlin to Cologne-Bonn,
we arbitrarily chose July 28 round 8 a.m. For the return flight, we chose August 1 round
7 p.m. Though the price differences vary as a function of various factors such as date
and flexibility, there can be little doubt that German Wings is substantially cheaper than
Lufthansa. It is true that German Wings is a partner of Lufthansa, but this does not
refute that the two carriers set different prices and may face different demand functions.
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experiment whether the goods and services provided by the local store suit
their preferences. Eventually, they also have to learn how to best consume
these. If this type of search and experimentation is costly, buying from a
new provider involves set-up costs. Thus, these set-up costs are a kind of
switching costs.
Of course, the same is true for new customers of global firms, or chain
stores, as we call them. The twist, though, is that if customers are mobile
and consume repeatedly, they have to incur the set-up cost only once when
buying from the chain store, whereas these costs have to be borne each time
they buy from another local store. Moving from one location to the other
with an exogenous probability, consumers cannot always buy from the same
local firm. Consequently, they risk to incur the set-up costs anew when first
buying from a local firm, while buying from a chain involves no such risk.
Put in a nutshell, this is the explanation our paper puts forth. We
show that in the unique equilibrium both types of stores are active. The
chain store charges a higher price and attracts more consumers than do local
stores. Low switching cost consumers buy from the local stores and high
switching costs consumers buy from the chain store. Moreover, the relative
profitability of the chain store increases as consumers become more mobile.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section
relates the paper to the existing literature. Section 3 introduces the model.
Section 4 analyzes the benchmark case with two local monopolies. Section 5
derives the unique symmetric equilibrium for the market structure with two
local stores competing with a chain. Section 6 then shows that the market
structure with a local store in each city and a chain store active in both
cities is the unique stable market structure if there is a small, positive entry
cost. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge, the idea that larger firms may gain more
customers while charging higher prices than smaller firms merely because
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of consumers’ switching costs has not been fully recognized in the previous
formal literature. For example, Stahl (1982) notes that a merger of local
stores to a chain store “appears exclusively connected to the input side of
the retailing activity, that is, to the exhaustion of economies of scale in
purchasing and distributing inputs.”
Switching costs as understood in this paper are a short-cut to search and
experimentation costs à la Nelson (1970), where consumers have to search
and experiment so as to find their most preferred good. Insofar as our
model does not allow for dynamic price competition, it is in some contrast
to a part of the switching cost literature. For example, Klemperer (1987,
1995)’s major concern is with the dynamic aspects of price competition when
consumers are locked in with their supplier due to switching costs, so that
sellers are tempted to use ’bargains followed by ripoffs’- pricing schemes
(Farrell and Klemperer, 2004). However, our approach is perfectly in line
with von Weizsacker (1984), whom we follow by assuming that firms do not
set different prices over time.
Two papers that deal with search costs but are not concerned with
switching costs are Stahl (1982) and Wolinsky (1983). Stahl illustrates how
a model of demand externalities creates agglomeration effects. Wolinsky
presents a model where imperfect information creates the need to search for
a suitable buy, leading firms to cluster at one location in order to reduce
search costs.
Baye and Morgan (2001) provide a model with equilibrium dispersion of
publicized prices, which arise because some consumers decide not to bear
the cost required to become informed about prices.4 Insofar as in our model
high switching cost consumers prefer paying higher prices to bearing the
switching cost, this is very similar to our model. In the model of Baye
and Morgan, though, the high and low priced firms are not determined ex
ante because the price dispersion stems from a mixed strategy equilibrium.
Consequently, in their model firm size does not matter.
Because chain stores are physically differentiated from local stores in
4For empirical evidence, see Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2004).
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that they are active in more locations than local stores, the paper also
relates to the product differentiation literature initiated by Hotelling (1929).
Janssen, Karamychev, and van Reeven (2003) study competition between
two firms with multiple outlets (chain stores) on the Salop (1979) circle,
where firms sell differentiated products to heterogenous consumers. In their
model, outlets from the same chain are homogenous but outlets across chains
are heterogenous. Whereas Janssen, Karamychev, and van Reeven (2003)
are concerned with location and pricing decisions of two chains, we are
interested in the effect of homogeneity of outlets from the same chain on
consumer choice if alternatively they can buy from heterogenous single outlet
firms.
Aside from explaining the above mentioned price patterns, our model
also provides a simple explanation for the remarkable asymmetry in firms
size as observed, e.g., in the retail and hotel industries. In the equilibrium of
our model, a local store’s market shares is at most one third.5 For alternative
explanations for such asymmetries, see, e.g., Bagwell, Ramey, and Spulber
(1997), Athey and Schmutzler (2001), Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) and
Hausman and Leibtag (2004).
3 The Model
There are two cities E (East) and W (West), each hosting one unit of risk
neutral consumers. Firms sell a homogenous product that generates utility
u for every consumer. Every consumer is assumed to bear exogenously given
switching costs s ∈ [0, σ] prior to buying the good for the first time in any
given type of firm or store,6 with u > σ.
The timing is as illustrated in Figure 1. After firms choose their prices
at date zero, each consumer observes the prices in his home city. Consumers
5For retailing, see, e.g., Bagwell and Ramey (1994), Bagwell, Ramey, and Spulber
(1997), Dinlersoz (2004) or www.stores.org. According to the last source the sales of Wal-
Mart, the largest retailer in the U.S., were approximately four times as large as those of
the second ranked Home Depot in 2003. For the hotel industry, Michael and Moore (1995)
report that 39 percent of all sales are accounted for by franchise chains.
6The expressions firms and stores are used interchangeably throughout the paper.
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Figure 1: Time line.
then decide in t = 1 from which firm to buy the good. At the intermediate
stage, each consumer moves to the other city with an exogenously given
probability α ∈ (0, 1). Throughout it is assumed that consumers and firms
know this probability but that ex ante neither firms nor consumers know
whether a particular consumer will move between period one and two. Con-
sumers who move to the other city then learn the prices prevalent in this
city.7 In period two, regardless of whether the consumer still is in the same
city or not, he decides again from which firm to buy the good or whether
not to buy at all. For simplicity, there is no discounting of future payoffs.
Though for the purpose of a consistent exposition we stick to the literal
two-city interpretation, the basic framework also applies to many other sit-
uations. For example, if consumers commute within a metropolitan area,
customers of retailers will face problems that are very similar to those in
the two-city interpretation. On the other hand, it is also clear that only the
literal interpretation is appropriate for hotel chains.8
7For simplicity, we assume that all consumers learn all prices in period two. But this
is clearly without any loss since the period two decisions of consumers who do not move
are not affected by the price of the local store in the other city.
8An additional or alternative interpretation is that α is the probability of a preference
shock for related goods, say, cosmetics. A chain store or brand like, e.g., NIVEA, can then
insure consumers against the cost of switching by offering several cosmetic products.
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3.1 Interpretation of Switching Costs
The switching costs considered in this paper have the interpretation of a fixed
cost of consumption. This is easily understood if one considers two different
supermarkets, each of whom sells a set of products (or brands) that at most
partially overlaps with those sold by its competitor. Assume also that each
consumer can find his optimal consumption bundle in either one of the two
supermarkets, but that finding or putting together this consumption bundle
involves a fixed cost s > 0. This cost may be due to time spent searching
for the products or to the (opportunity) cost of experimenting with different
products.9 If a consumer has invested s for one of the two supermarkets,
he will no longer be indifferent between them though he would have been
indifferent ex ante. Thus, the fix cost s is equivalent to a switching cost.
A similar reasoning applies in the case of hotels. Here, search costs for
customers do typically not accrue when searching within a given establish-
ment but when searching across different hotels in a given city. So as to
minimize search costs, a consumer who has found a suitable hotel that is
part of a chain in one city may want to go to a hotel belonging to the same
chain when staying in another city.
Viewing switching costs in this way also motivates the informational
assumption of the model. If consumers do not know what kind of stores to
expect in a yet unfamiliar city, they are probably also uncertain about the
prices prevailing in this city. Therefore, consumers only learn all prices in
the other city after moving to this city. However, if a chain store is present
in their home city as well as in the other city, consumers know exactly what
prices to expect at the chain store in the other city. A consumer deciding
whether to buy from the local or a chain store in t = 1 thus knows the local
store’s price in his home city and the chain store’s price charged in both
cities.
9Though consumers are modelled as homogenous with respect to gross utility, this
assumption is not crucial because the only thing that matters is that absent switching
costs, each consumer is indifferent between two different sellers if they set the same price.
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3.2 Consumers
There is a continuum of consumers with heterogenous switching costs. Con-
sumers’ switching costs s are uniformly distributed on [0, σ], so that the
density is 1
σ
for 0 ≤ s ≤ σ and zero otherwise. The probability α ∈ (0, 1)
of moving to the other city in period two is independent of s. Consumers
decide in t = 1 and t = 2 whether to buy one unit of the good, thereby
generating gross utility u or not to buy, in which case they get zero utility.
A consumer who buys twice from the same store at price p gets thus a net
utility of (u−p−s)+(u−p), while a consumer who buys from two different
stores at prices p′ and p′′ gets a net utility of (u − p′ − s) + (u − p′′ − s).
3.3 Firms
All firms have constant unit costs of production, which are normalized to
zero. This simplifying assumption allows to disentangle the effects of con-
sumer mobility and switching costs from the effects of increasing returns to
scale. We assume also that firms are committed to charge the same prices
in both periods. There are several possible and plausible justifications for
this assumption. First, period length may simply be too short to make
changing prices worthwhile. For example, if consumers commute and shop
at different locations in a metropolitan area on a daily basis, then changing
prices from day to day will probably not be optimal for retailers.10 Second,
though this is not part of the present paper, one can imagine a dynamic
game where the number of newcomers in every period is sufficiently large,
so that the bargain-and-ripoff strategy of low initial and high second pe-
riod prices does not pay if new and old customers cannot be distinguished
(see also von Weizsacker, 1984).11 Third, for industries where chains are
important the assumption of uniform prices over time seems to be more in
10Clearly, this argument applies much less for hotel chains because of the arguably
greater time length that elapses between purchases.
11Note that old customers are very unlikely to reveal their type if as a ”reward” for
this they have to pay higher prices. However, if firms are patient enough, they may play
alternating bargain-and-ripoff strategies in equilibrium; see Farrell and Klemperer (2004).
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accord with casual empirical observations than bargain-and-ripoff pricing.
Finally, uniform prices make the analysis much more tractable. Though we
have no definite results for the alternative with time varying prices, we do
not believe that the assumption of uniform prices is in any way crucial for
our main finding, which is that chain stores are profitable because they help
mobile consumers economize switching costs.
Firms are also restricted to charge the same price in all locations where
they are active. This assumption is obviously of no consequences for local
stores. It is, however, restrictive for chain stores. A chain could choose a
low price in one city and a high price in the other city in order to implement
a kind of bargain-and-ripoff strategy. In the present model, however, such a
bargain-and-ripoff strategy as experienced by consumers, say, in W is also a
ripoff-and-bargain strategy when viewed from the perspective of consumers
in E. Again, in order to abstract from such behavior we assume that the
chain sets a single price across locations.
4 Local Monopolies
To set the stage for analyzing the role played by a chain store, the benchmark
case of a local monopolist in each city is considered first. When there are
only local stores, they cannot help consumers save switching costs. Because
a consumer’s decision to buy from a given store will only depend on this
store’s price, each store acts independently of the other one.
Consider the local store in k ∈ {E,W}. Throughout, we use −k to
denote the city other than k. A consumer s in k in t = 1 will choose to shop
at this store if his expected net utility exceeds his switching costs, i.e., if
(2−α)(u−plk)−s ≥ 0. If the same consumer moves to the other city in t = 2,
he will choose the local store in −k, whenever u − pl
−k ≥ s. An analogous
argument applies for consumer s in −k. The local store in k charging price
p is thus confronted with a demand function consisting of three segments.
If the local stores price is very low (i.e., lower than u − σ), all consumers
shop and total demand is 2, consisting of the 2 − α consumers from k and
9
PSfrag replacements (2−α)2+α
2−α
u − σ u − 12−ασ u
p
Q(p)
2
0
Figure 2: Demand faced by a local monopolist.
the fraction α who move from −k to k.
If price is increased in k, then consumers who move from −k to k shop
if and only if u − p − s > 0 ⇔ s < u − p, while still all consumers originally
in k shop, i.e. 2 − α. This amounts to a demand of (2 − α) + α(u − p)/σ,
where 2 − α is overall demand from the home city and α(u − p)/σ is the
mass of consumers who move and who consume.
If price in k is increased further, then also some consumers originally in k
prefer not to shop at all. Consumers with (2−α)(u−p)−s < 0 do not shop
at all. Total demand then amounts to (2−α)(2−α)(u− p)/σ +α(u− p)/σ.
In sum, the local store faces the demand Q(p) with
Q(p) =



2 p ≤ u − σ
2 − α + αu−p
σ
u − σ < p ≤ u − 12−ασ[
(2 − α)2 + α
]
u−p
σ
u − 12−ασ < p ≤ u
. (1)
Figure 2 provides an illustration.
The optimal price is obtained by piecewise maximizing pQ(p). First
note that the optimal price will never be lower than u − σ. Otherwise
the local store could increase its price without losing any customers. Con-
sider next the second segment of demand which applies for prices p ∈
10
(
u − σ, u − 12−ασ
]
. Along this segment, the price elasticity of demand (de-
fined negatively) is always greater than minus one if u
σ
< 2(2−α)+α
2
α(2−α) .
12 In
this case, the local store always prefers a higher price, thus driving price up
to the upper bound of this segment, yielding
p̂ = u −
1
2 − α
σ (2)
as optimal price and Q(p̂) = (2−α)
2+α
2−α as quantity demanded.
If the elasticity of demand is always smaller than minus one,13 i.e., if
u
σ
< 2+α
α
, then price will be lowered until the lower bound for this segment,
u − σ, is reached. For values of u
σ
in between these two thresholds, the
optimal price is given by the first order condition from maximizing profit,
yielding
p∗ =
2 − α
α
1
2
σ +
1
2
u. (3)
For the third segment of Q(p), the elasticity of demand is smaller than
minus one if u − 12−ασ >
1
2u ⇔
u
σ
> 22−α , in which case the optimal price is
as low as possible, i.e., is equal to the lower bound of the segment. Other-
wise, the optimal price is given by the first order condition on this segment,
yielding
p∗ =
1
2
u. (4)
Summarizing, the optimal price p∗ is given by
p∗ =



u − σ 2+α
α
< u
σ
2−α
α
1
2σ +
1
2u
2(2−α)+α2
α(2−α) <
u
σ
≤ 2+α
α
u − 12−ασ
2
2−α <
u
σ
≤ 2(2−α)+α
2
α(2−α)
1
2u 1 ≤
u
σ
≤ 22−α
. (5)
12The elasticity is −α
σ
p
2−α+α
u−p
σ
. This is bigger than −1 if and only if u > 2p− σ
α
(2−α).
Since p is at most u− 1
2−α
σ, the right-hand side is not greater than 2u− ( 2
2−α
+(2−α))σ.
Re-arranging and simplifying yields the condition in the text.
13From the previous footnote, −α
σ
p
2−α+α
u−p
σ
< −1 ⇔ u < 2p − σ
α
(2 − α). Since p is at
least u − σ, the right-hand side is larger than 2(u − σ) − σ
α
(2 − α), whence the condition
in the text is obtained after some re-arranging.
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Welfare Given the zero-one-nature of consumption, maximum welfare
with two local monopolies is achieved when all consumers buy the good
in both periods. The price then only serves a distributional function, shift-
ing rents from consumers to firms. Note, however, that the local monopolists
choose a price p∗ sufficiently low to induce all consumers choose to buy the
good in both periods only if u
σ
> 2+α
α
. In all other cases, the local monopoly
creates a welfare loss.
5 Two Local Stores Compete with a Chain Store
The previous section analyzed equilibrium when a local monopolist serves
consumers in each city. The model is now extended by introducing a chain
store that operates an outlet in each city and competes with local stores.
The advantage of patronizing the chain store instead of local stores is that
consumers can economize switching costs: Even if they move to the other
city, they can visit the chain store in the new city without incurring addi-
tional set-up or switching costs if they have visited it in period one.
Let plk denote the price of the local store in city k ∈ {E,W} and p
c the
chain store’s price. Recall that consumers in k observe the price of the local
store in −k only in t = 2. Denote by Epl
−k the price of the local store in −k
expected by consumers living in k in t = 1.
Consider now what patterns firms’ equilibrium prices will exhibit. If all
firms charge the same price, all consumers will choose to patronize the chain
because it economizes on expected switching costs, thus leaving local stores
with zero profits. The next lemma shows that the chain store charges a
higher price than local stores in equilibrium.
Lemma 1. In any subgame perfect pure strategy equilibrium,
0 < plk < p
c < u for k ∈ {E,W}. (6)
Proof. Consider first the part 0 < plk < p
c. Suppose to the contrary that
plk ≥ p
c. Then nobody in k chooses the local store in t = 1. In t = 2 new
consumers arrive, who either chose the chain or local store in −k in t = 1.
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Those who chose the local store in −k will choose the chain in k since it
is cheaper. The same reasoning applies for the chain store customers from
−k. The consumers who were already in k in t = 1 all chose the chain store
in t = 1 or none and will do so again in t = 2. Therefore, with plk ≥ p
c
(assuming that everybody visits the chain in case of a tie) the local store
in k will have no customers at all. The only situation where this could be
part of an equilibrium is when prices are such that plk ≥ p
c = 0 because
in this case (and only in this case) the local store is indifferent between
having customers and having none. We now show that plk ≥ p
c = 0 cannot
be an equilibrium. To see this, note that s > 0 for a positive measure of
consumers. Consequently, the chain can make positive profits by setting a
sufficiently small but positive price, whereby it attracts a positive measure
of consumers. By setting a price somewhat smaller than pc but still strictly
positive, the local store attracts those consumers with very low switching
costs, so that it realizes positive profits. Hence, plk ≥ p
c cannot be.
Consider now the part pc < u. Suppose to the contrary that pc ≥ u.
In this case, no consumer will patronize the chain in t = 2. Given that
consumers do not choose the chain in t = 2, they will not choose the chain
in t = 1 either. By setting its price above u the chain thus makes zero
profits. If a local store sets plk > 0, the chain can make positive profit by
lowering its price just below min{plk, u}. This proves the lemma.
Lemma 1 shows that both firms will charge positive prices that are
smaller than u. Charging a price of zero is not optimal because for α > 0 the
two firms do no longer sell identical products and can thus attract different
consumers: Low switching cost consumers prefer the local store while high
switching cost consumers prefer the chain.
5.1 Restricting Consumers’ Equilibrium Strategies
This subsection shows that consumers’ optimal strategies can essentially
be narrowed down to three alternatives: Consumers (1) always choose the
chain, (2) always choose a local store, or (3) choose the local store in t = 1
13
and if they do not move in t = 2 and do not shop if they move.
The basic argument is going to be as follows. Lemma 2 shows that
consumers who are inactive in period two are either inactive in both periods
or patronize local stores in period one. Lemma 3 then states that whoever
buys from the chain store does so in both periods. This is (1). An immediate
implication of Lemma 3 is that consumers do not switch types of stores,
which is the content of Corollary 1. Therefore, the relevant alternatives to
(1) is to always patronize local stores (which is (2)) or to always patronize
the local store in the home city and to be inactive in the other city (which
is (3)).
If a consumer did not shop at all in t = 1, his decision problem is identical
to the decision of a local shop customer who had to move to the other city.
Since plk < p
c by Lemma 1, such a consumer will either choose the local
store in t = 2 or not shop at all. Although it is excluded that consumers
choose the chain in t = 2 after they chose the local in t = 1, they could still
remain inactive in the second period. The following lemma describes the
optimal behavior of consumers who are inactive in t = 2.
Lemma 2. If a consumer prefers to stay inactive in t = 2 when he ...
(i) ... does not move, then he also prefers to stay inactive in t = 1.
(ii) ... moves, then he chooses either the local store or stays inactive in
t = 1.
Proof. (i) Whenever in t = 2 a consumer prefers being inactive to buying
from the same store he bought from in t = 1 when he has not moved, then
this store’s price must be larger than u. But then he prefers being inactive
in t = 1 already. (ii) Suppose to the contrary that he chooses the chain in
t = 1. Then it must be the case that pc > u. But then, as above, he prefers
being inactive in t = 1 already.
Lemma 3. Whoever buys from the chain buys from it in both periods,
whether he moves or not.
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Proof. Denote by V (x, y, z) the expected utility of a consumer who plays
the strategy (x, y, z), meaning ”buy from x in t = 1, from y in t = 2 if not
moved and from z if moved” with x, y, z ∈ {0, c, l}, where 0 stands for not
buying at all, c for buying from the chain and l for buying from the local.
The strategy of the proof is to show that any strategy that contains at least
one c and at most two c’s is dominated by a strategy that does either contain
no c or by the strategy (c, c, c).
First, it is straightforward to check that (c, c, c) dominates any strategy
that contains one or two c’s and 0 elsewhere because by Lemma 1, pc < u.
Second, one can show that buying from the chain only in t = 2 and from at
least one local in any other city or period is dominated by a strategy that
does not contain any c. The proof is immediate because one can replace any
c that appears in the strategy by an l: The switching cost is borne in either
case, but the local’s price is smaller.
Third, consider strategies where the chain is chosen in t = 1, but some
local is chosen in t = 2. The basic procedure of the proof is again the same:
Replace any c by an l. Complications arise only when establishing that
V (c, l, c) < max{V (c, c, c), V (l, l, l)}. To see that this indeed holds, consider
a consumer who is initially in k and notice that
V (c, c, c) = 2(u − pc) − s > 2u − (1 + α)pc − (1 − α)plk − (2 − α)s = V (c, l, c)
⇔ s > pc − plk. (7)
On the other hand,
V (c, l, c) = 2u − (1 + α)pc − (1 − α)plk − (2 − α)s >
2u − (2 − α)plk − αEp
l
−k − (1 + α)s = V (l, l, l) (8)
⇔ (2α − 1)s > pc − plk + α(p
c − Epl
−k).
Since the summands on the right-hand side are positive by Lemma 1, the
condition requires s to be smaller than something negative for α < 12 , which
cannot be. For α > 12 , the condition reads
s >
1
2α − 1
(pc − plk) +
α
2α − 1
(pc − Epl
−k). (9)
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A necessary condition for this condition to be satisfied is s > (pc − plk).
But if s > (pc − plk) holds, then V (c, c, c) > V (c, l, c) holds. Thus, either
V (c, c, c) > V (c, l, c) or V (l, l, l) > V (c, l, c). This completes the proof.
Lemma 3 has the following immediate corollary:
Corollary 1. Consumers do not change type of stores from t = 1 to t = 2.
Due to Lemma 1, there will always be some consumers in each city
choosing the local store in t = 1 in any pure strategy equilibrium. If some
consumer s0 chooses to patronize the local store in t = 1, then so will any
consumer with s ∈ [0, s0]. Since according to Corollary 1, consumers do not
switch the type of store between t = 1 and t = 2 and since according to
Lemma 3, all consumers who choose the chain in t = 1 will do so again in
t = 2, there remain five relevant strategies for consumers in k:
• always patronize local stores, (l, l, l), with payoff:
V k(l,l,l)(s) := (2 − α)(u − p
l
k) − s + α(u − Ep
l
−k − s),
• patronize local store in k and patronize no store in −k if moved, (l, l, 0),
with payoff:
V k(l,l,0)(s) := (2 − α)(u − p
l
k) − s,
• always patronize the chain store, (c, c, c), with payoff:
V k(c,c,c)(s) := (2 − α)(u − p
c) − s + α(u − pc) = 2(u − pc) − s,
• only patronize the local store in the other city, (0, 0, l), with payoff:
V k(0,0,l)(s) := α(u − p
l
−k − s), or
• always remain inactive, (0, 0, 0), with payoff:
V k(0,0,0)(s) := 0.
Note that if the strategy (l, l, 0) is the preferred strategy for consumer s,
then it must be true that V k(l,l,0)(s) > V
k
(c,c,c)(s), i.e.,
(2 − α)(pc − plk) > α(u − p
c). (10)
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Figure 3: Partition of the set of consumers in k if (10) does not hold.
Since this condition is independent of s, no consumer at all will choose the
chain store in k if it holds. Observe that condition (10) can only hold in
equilibrium, if plk 6= p
l
−k for otherwise condition (10) holds in both cities and
the chain has no customers at all.
Next we briefly discuss the strategies (0, 0, l) and (0, 0, 0). In the proof
of Proposition 1, we will show that the strategy (0, 0, 0) is not played on the
equilibrium path. Second, if the strategy (0, 0, l) is played in equilibrium
by some consumers with s in k, then no consumer in −k plays (0, 0, l) in
equilibrium. To see this, observe that optimality of (0, 0, l) in k requires
u − plk − s < 0 and u − p
l
−k − s > 0, which implies p
l
−k < p
l
k. Clearly, this
precludes plk < p
l
−k, which would be needed for (0, 0, l) to be optimal for
some s in −k. Observe that this implies that (0, 0, l) can only be played
in an equilibrium where the two local stores set different prices. Hence, it
cannot occur in a symmetric equilibrium.
5.2 Equilibrium
In a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in pure strategies, consumers’ ex-
pectations about the local store’s price in the other city must be correct,
i.e., equilibrium prices must be a solution to
Eplk = p
l
k for k = E,W. (11)
Condition (11) is a necessary condition for rational expectations. However,
it does not rule out expectations such as Epl
−k = p
l
k. These expectations
may be self-fulfilling and hence correct in a symmetric equilibrium, yet they
fail the following rationality requirement. Suppose p∗ is the symmetric equi-
librium price set by both local stores, and consider a unilateral deviation by
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the local store in k to some p̂ 6= p∗. If expectations are formed according to
the rule Epl
−k = p
l
k, then Ep
l
−k 6= p
∗ after the deviation. That is, these ex-
pectations are incorrect even though the player in −k about whose behavior
expectations are formed has not changed his behavior. Therefore, we define
rational expectations as14
Definition 1. Expectations are called rational if they are correct in equilib-
rium and if they are correct when the player about the behavior of whom the
expectations are formed does not deviate.
Throughout, we restrict attention to expectations that are rational in
this sense. This restriction has some bite insofar as there can be equilibria
with self-fulfilling expectations that are not rational.
Suppose that condition (10) does not hold. As the proof of Proposition
1 will show, this is indeed the case in equilibrium. In this case the strategy
to shop at the local store as long as one does not move (l, l, 0) is dominated
by always choosing the chain store (c, c, c). Consumers are thus divided into
three groups. Low switching cost consumers with s ≤ sk always choose local
stores, where
sk :=
2 − α
α
(pc − plk) + (p
c − Epl
−k). (12)
Medium switching cost consumers with s ∈ (sk, s] always choose chain stores,
where
s := min {2(u − pc), σ} . (13)
14Witness the similarities to, and differences from, the problem encountered in models
of vertical integration and foreclosure, where an upstream monopolist offers contracts to,
say, two downstream competitors (see, e.g., Chen and Riordan, 2003). Contracts being
unobservable to outsiders, each downstream firm forms beliefs about the contract offered
to the competitor. In equilibrium, these beliefs must be correct, but it is hard to pin down
what a firm should believe about the contract offered to the competitor if the contract
it receives differs from the one it should have received in equilibrium. Insofar as the
downstream firm observes deviation by the upstream monopolist, the problem is similar
to the problem of a consumer in k in our model who observes deviation by the local store in
k. The crucial difference, though, is that the downstream firm forms expectations about
the behavior of the player whose deviating it has observed, whereas in our model, the
expectation concerns another player whom one has not observed to deviate and who has
no incentives to do so in a Nash equilibrium.
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High switching cost consumers with s ∈ [s, σ] do not shop at all; see Figure
3. The min-operator in (13) is necessary because the support of s is [0, σ].
Notice that the set of high switching cost consumers who do not shop can
be empty. In deriving the demand functions below, it is assumed that all
consumers shop (i.e., that this set is empty), implying s = σ. The proof of
Proposition 1 shows that this is indeed the case in equilibrium.
Given some prices pck ≤ p
c, and Eplk < p
c for both k, the local store in k
thus faces the demand function
Qlk := (2 − α)
1
σ
[
2 − α
α
(pc − plk) + (p
c − Epl
−k)
]
+α
1
σ
[
2 − α
α
(pc − pl
−k) + (p
c − Eplk)
]
.
(14)
Maximizing Qlk(p
l
k)p
l
k with respect to p
l
k for both k yields the first order
condition for the local store in k
0 = 4pc − 2α(2 − α)Epl
−k − α
2Eplk − 2(2 − α)
2plk with k = E,W. (15)
A local store’s best response function is
pl∗k
(
Eplk, Ep
l
−k
)
=
4pc − 2α(2 − α)Epl
−k − α
2Eplk
2(2 − α)2
. (16)
The chain store faces the demand
Qc(pc) :=
(
2 − Qlk
)
+
(
2 − Ql
−k
)
(17)
and maximizes Qc(pc)pc with respect to pc. Its first order condition is
0 = −8pc + 2σα + (2 − α)plk + αEp
l
k + (2 − α)p
l
−k + αEp
l
−k. (18)
We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
Proposition 1. The game has a unique symmetric SPE in pure strategies
with rational expectations. Equilibrium prices are
pl∗ :=
α
(2 − α)2 + 2
σ pc∗ :=
α[(2 − α)2 + 4]
4[(2 − α)2 + 2]
σ (19)
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with pl∗k = p
l∗
−k = p
l∗, and expectations satisfy
Epl∗k = Ep
l∗
−k = p
l∗. (20)
Equilibrium quantities and profits are, respectively,
Ql∗ :=
(2 − α)2
(2 − α)2 + 2
Qc∗ :=
2[(2 − α)2 + 4]
(2 − α)2 + 2
(21)
Πl∗ :=
α(2 − α)2
[(2 − α)2 + 2]2
σ Πc∗ :=
α[(2 − α)2 + 4]2
2[(2 − α)2 + 2]2
σ, (22)
where Ql∗k = Q
l∗
−k = Q
l∗ and Πl∗k = Π
l∗
−k = Π
l∗.
Proof. Existence The three first order conditions (15) for k = E,W and
(18) and the two expectation consistency conditions (11) constitute a linear
system of five equations in pc, plk, p
l
−k, Ep
l
k and Ep
l
−k. This system of equa-
tions has a unique solution, which is given by the prices in the proposition.
At these prices, all consumers shop in both cities. We thus have s∗ = σ.
Since the chain store’s profit function was derived under the assumption that
s ≡ min{2(u − pc), σ} = σ, it is necessary to verify whether the chain has
an incentive to deviate, adopting a high price such that s < σ. However,
this cannot occur because when deriving the prices, too many consumers
were assumed to buy from the chain store if the assumption s = σ does not
hold. That is, we imposed a too favorable demand facing the chain store.
Consequently, if under this assumption the chain does not choose a price
sufficiently high to induce s∗ < σ, then it will a fortiori not choose such a
high price when demand is smaller.
Next it needs to be verified whether the chain store has an incentive
to deviate from equilibrium to pc = pl∗ in order to attract all consumers,
leaving the local stores with zero demand. If the chain store chooses price
pl∗, it attracts Ql∗ additional customers in each city. The additional revenue
thereby generated is pl∗Ql∗ per city. However, in each city the chain store
loses the revenue (pc∗−pl∗)(2−Ql∗) on the customers it would have attracted
even without the deviation. Deviation to pl∗ is therefore profitable if and
only if
∆Π := Ql∗pl∗ −
(
2 − Ql∗
)
(pc∗ − pl∗) > 0. (23)
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Note that pc∗ − pl∗ = (2−α)
2
4 ≥ 1 for all α, 2 − Q
l∗ = 12Q
c∗ and 12Q
c∗ > Ql∗.
Therefore,
∆Π = pl∗
[
Ql∗ −
1
2
Qc∗
(2 − α)2
4
]
≤ pl∗
[
Ql∗ −
1
2
Qc∗
]
< 0. (24)
Hence, it is not profitable for the chain store to deviate to pl∗ or to any lower
price.
Alternatively, a local store could deviate to a lower price in order to push
the chain store out of the market completely. Fix the chain store’s and the
other local store’s prices at pc∗ and pl∗ respectively. The local store in k
could then set its price so low as to make condition (10) hold. To this end
it must choose price plk ≤ p
D, where pD is such that condition (10) holds
with equality, i.e.,
(2 − α)(pc∗ − pD) = α(u − pc∗) ⇔ pD =
2pc∗ − αu
2 − α
. (25)
But 2pc∗ = (2−α)
2+4
2(2−α)2+4ασ < ασ < αu, where the last inequality holds by
assumption. Hence, pD < 0 follows, proving that the deviation does not pay
for a local store.
Last, we must rule out that a local firm has an incentive to deviate in
such a way that some consumers play the strategy (0, 0, l), i.e., do not shop
in their home city but do shop after moving. Given the information structure
of the model and consumers’ expectations as stated in the proposition, the
only way the local store in k can induce only some consumers in k to play
this strategy by increasing its price. This, though, will leave the demand
function it faces in period one unaffected since consumers have rational
expectations, and will not increase the demand it faces in period two. But
under these conditions it has already been shown that a price increase does
not pay. This completes the proof that the strategy profile stated in the
proposition constitutes a SPE.
Uniqueness In deriving the above equilibrium prices, two crucial assump-
tions on the prevailing demand structure were made: (i) all consumers shop,
i.e., s∗ = σ and (ii) that condition (10) does not hold.
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(i) Suppose that s ≡ min{2(u − pc), σ} < σ. That is, the set of high
switching cost consumers who do not shop at all is non-empty. Notice that
this does not affect the local stores’ profit functions. Consequently, their
first order conditions are still given by (15). With s = 2(u − pc), the chain
store’s profit function is
Πc(pc) =
(
2
2(u − pc)
σ
− Qlk
)
pc +
(
2
2(u − pc)
σ
− Ql
−k
)
, (26)
yielding the first order condition
0 = 4αu + 2pl
−k + 2p
l
k − 8αp
c + αEpl
−k − αp
l
k + αEp
l
k − αp
l
−k − 8p
c. (27)
In addition, conditions (11) have to be satisfied. Candidate equilibrium
prices are given as solution to equations (15), (27) and (11). These prices
are
p̃l :=
2αu
6 + α[(2 − α)2 + α]
and p̃c :=
(2 − α)2 + 4
4
p̃l. (28)
These prices, however, imply
s = 2u −
α(α2 − 4α + 8)
α3 − 3α2 + 4α + 6
u > u > σ, (29)
where the first inequality follows because the fraction is less than one for
all α and the second inequality holds by assumption. Thus, there is no
equilibrium with s < σ.
(ii) Suppose that condition (10) holds. That is, assume that the chain
attracts no customers in k. If the chain neither attracts consumers in −k,
then lowering its price until it attracts some generates positive revenue. So,
assume that the chain attracts some consumers in −k. Then condition (10)
must not hold in −k, implying
pl
−k > p
l
k. (30)
The chain store’s demand is then given by some consumers in −k and
by those of them who move from −k to k. Its total demand is thus
Qc(pc) =
2
σ
[s − s−k] =
2
σ
[
s −
2 − α
α
(pc − pl
−k) − (p
c − Eplk)
]
. (31)
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For the case s = σ, the first order conditions from maximizing pcQc yields
the chain store’s reaction function
pc∗(pl
−k, Ep
l
k) =
1
4
[
ασ + (2 − α)pl
−k + αEp
l
k
]
. (32)
Now condition (10) for city k requires that 2pc > αu + (2 − α)plk. Using
Eplk = p
l
k and inserting p
c∗(pl
−k, Ep
l
k) for p
c, condition (10) reads
1
4
[
ασ + (2 − α)pl
−k + αp
l
k
]
>
1
2
[
αu + (2 − α)pl
−k
]
(33)
⇔ αplk > α(2u − σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>u
) + (2 − α)pl
−k > αu, (34)
where the last inequality is due to u > σ. Condition (10) in k thus requires
plk > u. But this cannot be an equilibrium since the local store in k has no
consumers in this case.
For s = 2(u − pc) < σ, the chain store’s profit function is
Πc(pc) =
2
σ
[
2(u − pc) −
2 − α
α
(pc − pl
−k) − (p
c − Eplk)
]
pc. (35)
Thus, its reaction function is
pc∗
(
pl
−k, Ep
l
k
)
=
1
4(1 + α)
[
2αu + (2 − α)pl
−k + αEp
l
k
]
. (36)
Proceeding as before, one gets
1
4(1 + α)
[
2αu + (2 − α)pl
−k + αEp
l
k
]
>
1
2
[
αu + (2 − α)pl
−k
]
(37)
⇒
1
4
[
2αu + (2 − α)pl
−k + αEp
l
k
]
>
1
2
[
αu + (2 − α)pl
−k
]
(38)
⇔ αplk > (2 − α)p
l
−k ⇔ p
l
k > p
l
−k (39)
for condition (10). But this contradicts (30). There exists thus no equilib-
rium with condition (10) holding.
The only demand constellation we have not yet considered is where some
consumers play (0, 0, l) on the equilibrium path. However, as noted above,
(0, 0, l) can only occur with plk 6= p
l
−k and can thus not occur in a symmetric
equilibrium. Hence, the equilibrium is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
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Discussion Market Shares and Profits. According to Proposition 1, the
chain store’s profits in each city (which are equal to half of the chain store’s
total profit Πc∗) are larger than the profits of a local store. Prices and profits
of both local stores and the chain store increase in α, but Πc∗ increases faster
in α than Πl∗. Note also that Qc∗(α) is strictly increasing in α. It equals
8/3 for α = 0 and is equal to 10/3 for α = 1. Because equilibrium demand
aggregated over both periods and both cities is four, the chain store’s market
coverage increase from 2/3 to 5/6 as α increases from zero to one.
Predicted Price Differences. The model predicts also that local stores
charge lower prices than chain stores. To see this, notice that
pc∗ =
(2 − α)2 + 4
4
pl∗ > pl∗ (40)
for all α. At first sight, this may seem at odds with empirical facts if
one thinks of, say, the retail industry.15 However, this indicates only that
switching costs are not the only driving factor in the retail industry, where
increasing returns and market power on the input side may be at least as
important. On the other hand, there are other industries where observed
pricing patterns are hard to understand without the factors that our model
emphasizes. As mentioned at the very beginning, a local provider of bus
trips from New York City to Boston is substantially cheaper than the large
chain. Similarly, the regional airline German Wings offers flights that are
cheaper by orders of magnitude than those of Lufthansa. Starbucks, the
largest coffee house chain, is not exactly known for providing cheap coffee,
though the price differences here are certainly less striking than those for
bus trips or airfares. Casual empiricism in the hotel industry also suggests
that large chains are by no means cheaper than local hotels offering the same
quality. More importantly, though, there is also some systematic evidence
from the banking industry that is in line with the price pattern predicted
by our model. Ishii (2004) estimates the effect of ATM surcharges on retail
banking industry structure and welfare (see also Knittel and Stango, 2005).
Surcharges for withdrawing cash from banks other than the one at which a
15See, e.g., Hausman and Leibtag (2004).
24
customer has his or her deposit account impose a cost of switching banks
to the consumer. Ishii finds that consumers prefer banks with larger ATM
networks, arguably because of lower expected surcharge payments. She finds
that banks with larger ATM networks pay lower interest rates on deposits,
which corresponds to charging a higher price in our model.
Public Prices of Local Stores. The assumption that local stores’ prices are
only known locally has some consequences that are worth a brief discussion.
Consider the local store in k. Differentiating its best response function (16)
with respect to consumers’ expectations Eplk yields
∂pl∗k (Ep
l
k)
∂Epl
k
= −
1
2
(
α
2 − α
)2
< 0. (41)
That is, the lower the expected price, the higher the optimal price of the
local store in k. The reason for this is straightforward. A lower expected
price implies a larger demand, and the larger demand in turn induces the
local store to set a higher price. However, since in equilibrium consumers
cannot be fooled, Eplk = p
l
k must hold, implying that a high price and low
expected price are not consistent.
This behavior is reminiscent of the well known problem of the durable
goods seller uncovered by Coase (1972), in which consumers’ (correct) ex-
pectations of lower future prices reduce demand in the presence, as a con-
sequence of which price in the presence is reduced as well. A durable goods
seller who could commit not to lower its price in the future would make a
larger profit. Very similarly, the local stores in our model could gain if they
could credibly communicate their prices in both cities in period one, thereby
committing themselves not to ”cheat” on consumers.
Having said that, we should emphasize that the assumption that local
stores’ prices are not completely public information is not only more realistic
than assuming that they are known in both cities, but it is also without
consequences for the qualitative predictions of our model. If we assumed
instead that the prices of local stores are known in both cities in period one,
the chain store would still set a higher price and make a larger profit than
local stores.
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6 Industry Equilibrium with Costly Entry
So far, we took market structures as given. In section 4, we analyzed the
market structure with local monopolies, and in the previous section we ana-
lyzed the interplay of a chain store that competes with a local store in every
city. An interesting question is whether one of these configurations is stable
in the sense that all firms that are active make non-negative profits and that
no additional firms have incentives to enter the market.
As has already been seen, though local monopolies make positive profits,
the market structure with a local monopoly in each city is not stable because
a chain can profitably enter. So as to show that the market structure of
section 5 is stable, we thus have to show that no additional local store and
no additional chain has an incentive to enter if this market structure prevails.
Lemma 4. If there are two or more stores of the same type (local or chain)
in a city, at least two of them charge a price of zero, and all stores of the
this type make zero profits.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that some firm makes positive profits. The
only way that this can happen is that it charges a positive price. But
given that this firm serves customers at a positive price, another firm of
the same type will have an incentive to slightly undercut this price and get
all the customers from this firm. Clearly, this race to the bottom will only
stop if one of the firms charges a price equal to zero. So that a firm that
charges a price of zero has no incentive to raise its price, it must be the
case that another firm sets a price of zero as well. This proves the claim
about equilibrium prices. As to profits, note first that all firms that charge
a price of zero trivially make zero profits. Second, any firm that charges a
higher price will have no customers and consequently will make zero profits,
too.
Lemma 4 implies that the market structure with one local store in each
city and one chain serving both cities is the unique market structure if entry
into the industry is associated with some positive costs. Starting with no
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firms at all, either a local or a chain store can profitably enter the market.
If a local store enters, no other local store will enter the same city, since
profits would be zero. Another local store will only enter in the other city.
If there is a local store in each city, a chain can still enter profitably but,
due to Lemma 4, not more than one chain will enter. Thus, we have:
Proposition 2. With small but positive entry costs, the unique stable mar-
ket structure consists of a chain store with an outlet in both cities and a local
store in each city.
Regarding welfare, this market structure only achieves second-best. Since
u > σ and since production costs are zero, it is optimal that all consumers
consume the good in both periods. As Proposition 1 showed, all consumers
shop in equilibrium in both periods. However, some of them shop at local
stores and are thus confronted with expected switching costs of (1 + α)s.
With two competing chains, prices are zero and all consumers shop in both
periods. But now expected switching costs are only s for all consumers.
Therefore, first-best would be achieved by two competing chains, which is
not a stable market structure, though. The unique stable market structure
thus generates higher welfare than do two local monopolists, yet fails to
attain first-best.
7 Conclusions
We study a two city model where mobile consumers face costs of switching
sellers. Since consumers change the city with an exogenous probability, they
can reduce expected switching costs by shopping at a chain store rather
than at a local store. If consumers differ with respect to switching costs,
firm size serves as a means of product differentiation, where local stores
serve low switching cost consumers and chain stores serve high switching
cost consumers.
This model provides four key insights. First, the market structure with
a local store and a chain store in each city is the unique stable market
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structure if there is a small, positive cost of entry. That is, local stores
coexist in equilibrium with the chain store. Second, the chain store charges
a higher price than local stores. Third, as consumers become more mobile,
the market share of the chain store increases, and so do profits and prices of
all stores. Finally, the chain store becomes more profitable relative to local
stores as mobility increases.
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